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Abstract
Market risk is normally associated with instruments traded on well defined markets,
though increasingly, techniques are used to assess the risk arising from over the
counter instruments, and/or traded items where the market is not very liquid. The value
of any instrument will be a function of price, coupon, coupon frequency, time, interest
rate and other factors. If a bank is holding instruments on account (for example
equities, bonds), then it is exposed to market risk, the risk that the price of the
instrument will be volatile. Systematic market risk is caused by a movement in the
prices of all market instruments because of, for example, a change in economic policy.
Unsystematic market risk arises in situations where the price of one instrument moves
out of line with other similar instruments, because of an event related to the issuer of
the instrument.
 Value at risk (VaR) has become the standard measure that financial analysts use to
quantify market risk. VaR is defined as the maximum potential change in value of a
3portfolio of financial instruments with a given probability over a certain horizon. More
specific, it is the maximum loss which can occur with X% confidence over a holding
period of n days. The results produced by a VaR model are simple for all levels of staff
from all areas of an organization to understand and appreciate. That is why VaR has
been adopted so rapidly.
Increased volatility of financial markets and rapid enhancement of computer systems
gave banks an important characteristic. Bank would now be a risk manager compared
to their former “traditional” role. The science of risk management is not a mature field
of knowledge but it constantly evolves. The most prominent of risks – on which a bank
is exposed – is market risk since it reflects the potential economic loss caused by the
decrease in the market value of a portfolio. Value at Risk (VaR) is the most common
measure that financial analysts, banks and supervisors use to measure market risk.
The concept of systematic risk has played an important role in finance since Markowitz
formalized the notion that investors should hold a diversified portfolio under
uncertainty. There have been lots of financial studies concerning beta coefficient: its
estimation has “traditionally” been achieved by running a market model regression. Is it
important for a company and the investor too? What about the stability of beta and its
behavior in bull and bear markets? May the downside risk, as measured by the beta
corresponding to bear market, be an appropriate measure of portfolio risk? All of these
questions and more other will be answered, in order to be clarified, after reading the
paper, what market risk is, which are the specific risks that modern banks have to
measure, what Value at Risk is and how we can use it to measure all of these risks,
what other types of risk measurement exists, what beta coefficient is and what
systematic risk is.
On this project the VaR approach and the most popular coefficient in finance, beta,
will be presented while trying to analyze market risk, on which a bank is exposed. Beta
coefficient of five Greek banks’ stocks will be defined in bull and bear markets using
Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS). The VaR of a hypothetical portfolio will be
also estimated using “beta model” and will be compared to the variance – covariance
method.
Introduction
In finance there is the opinion that prices are not only affected by external facts but and
from causes that are related to the internal operation of the markets and the
psychology of the investors. Theoretically, if someone is in order to know the cause of
a fact, then he can predict, manage and control his risk. Many researches, that were
made the last decades, have led to the conclusion that the volatility of the prices could
not be explained by the known financial theories and could not be depicted in normal
distribution diagrams. From 1916 until 2003 variations above 3,4% of Dow Jones
were observed for more than 1000 days, which normally could have never been above
58 days. In 2002 Shiller and other scholars came to the conclusion that such disorders
come in conflict with efficient markets. Many thought that all this instability was due to
the change of pricing model. For a long time the known Merrill Lynch was using the
4Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), publishing catalogues with rates of systematic
risk that were useful to brokers and investors in order to build efficient portfolios.
However, the recession of 19/10/1987 made Dow Jones to fall by 29,2% and caused
the collapse of all these well designed portfolios and everyone then could recognize the
complexity of the world market economy.
It is a fact that the increased volatility of the variance, that is observed longitudinal,
even if important financial information are missing, makes the effective risk
management to be one of the most important and crucial section for the financial
researchers and for the modern banks. Every financial institution should in daily basis
evaluate the risk value and hold their capital for protection from contingent losses.
A financial institution is supposed to be the basic risk manager and one general
procedure that measure the market risk that its portfolio is exposed; it is the Value at
Risk (VAR). The volatility of each stock in a portfolio depends on the correlation with
the market and that is defined by the beta or systematic risk.
But how is beta acting when the market moves upwards or downwards and how the
volatility of beta can influence the Value at Risk of the portfolio? This research is
supposed to answer this question by using the beta model combined with a research of
Kim and Zumwalt on instability of systematic risk in bull and bear markets.
The first chapter shows how the crisis in America influences the global economy and
the European markets and the changing of the role of the financial institutions to the
new reality and at last the importance of risk management of the portfolios. Also, in
this chapter it is shown how we estimate those risks concentrating mainly in Value at
Risk method for measuring market risk.
The second chapter has a brief presentation of investing theories from the era of
Markowitz and the characteristics of systematic risk are being analyzed. Furthermore,
it is shown the attitude of the investors towards risk.
The empirical part in chapter three shows the volatility of beta of five Greek bank
stocks in bull and bear markets and an estimation of Value at Risk of a hypothetical
portfolio is been included by using the variance and beta model in comparison with the
covariance.
CHAPTER 1: Market risk in modern banks and VaR estimation
1.1. Modern bank and financial risks
1.1.1. A crisis of historic proportions
The financial crisis that hit the global economy since the summer of 2007 is without
precedent in post-war economy history. Although its size and extent are exceptional,
the crisis has many features in common with similar financial-stress driven recession
episodes in the past. The crisis was preceded by long period of rapid credit growth,
low risk premiums, abundant availability of liquidity, strong leveraging, soaring asset
prices and the development of bubbles in the real estate sector. Over-stretched
leveraging positions rendered financial institutions extremely vulnerable to corrections
5in asset markets. As a result a turn-around in a relatively small corner of the financial
system was sufficient to topple the whole structure. Such episodes have happened
before (e.g. Japan and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, the Asian crisis in the
late 1990s). However, this time was different, with the crisis being global akin to the
events that triggered the Great Depression of the 1930s.
While it may be appropriate to consider the Great Depression as the best benchmark in
terms of its financial triggers, it has also served as a great lesson. At present,
governments and central banks are well aware of the need to avoid the policy mistakes
that were common at the time, both in the Europe and elsewhere. Large-scale bank
runs have been avoided, monetary policy has been eased aggressively, and
governments have released substantial fiscal stimulus. Unlike the experience during the
Great Depression, countries in Europe and elsewhere have not resorted to
protectionism at the scale of 1930s. It demonstrates the importance of Europe
coordination, even if this crisis provides an opportunity for further progress in this
regard. 
In its early stages, the crisis manifested itself as an acute liquidity shortage among
financial institutions as they experienced ever stiffer market conditions for rolling over
their debt. In this phase, concerns over the solvency of financial institutions were
increasing, but a systematic collapse was deemed unlikely. This perception dramatically
changed when a major investment bank (Lehman Brothers) defaulted in September
2008. Confidence collapsed, investors massively liquidated their positions and stock
markets went into a tailspin. From then onward the Europe economy entered the
steepest downturn on record since the 1930s. The transmission of financial distress to
the real economy evolved at record speed, with credit restraint and sagging confidence
hitting business investment and household demand, notably for consumer durables and
housing. The cross-border transmission was also extremely rapid, due to the tight
connections within the financial system itself and also the strongly integrated supply
chains in global product markets.
The ongoing recession is thus likely to leave deep and long-lasting traces on economic
performance and entail social hardship of many kinds. Job losses can be contained for
some time by flexible unemployment benefit arrangements, but eventually the impact of
rapidly rising unemployment will be felt, with downturns in housing markets occurring
simultaneously affecting households. The fiscal positions of governments will continue
to deteriorate, not only for cyclical reasons, but also in a structural manner as tax bases
shrink on a permanent basis and contingent liabilities of governments stemming from
bank rescues may materialize. An open question is whether the crisis will weaken the
incentives for structural reform and thereby adversely affect potential growth further,
or whether it will provide an opportunity to undertake far-reaching policy actions. 
1.1.2. Crisis management
The current crisis has demonstrated the importance of a coordinated framework for
crisis management. It should contain the following building blocks:
6 Crisis Prevention to prevent a repeat in the future. This should be mapped onto
a collective judgment as to what the principal causes of the crisis were and how
changes in macroeconomic, regulatory and supervisory policy frameworks
could help prevent their recurrence. Policies to boost potential economic
growth and competiveness could also bolster the resilience to future crisis.
 Crisis Control and Mitigation to minimize the damage by preventing systemic
defaults or by containing the output loss and easing the social hardship
stemming from recession. Its main objective is thus to stabilize the financial
system and the real economy in the short run. It must be coordinated across the
Europe in order to strike the right balance between national preoccupations and
spillover effects affecting other Member States.
 Crisis Resolution to bring crises to a lasting close, and at the lowest possible
cost for the taxpayer while containing systemic risk and securing consumer
protection. This requires reversing temporary support measures as well action
to restore economies to sustainable growth and fiscal paths. Inter alia, this
includes policies to restore banks’ balance sheets, the restructuring of the
sector and an orderly policy exit. 
The bank crisis and the bankruptcy of financial institutions in the last two decades had
negative causes in real economy and especially for the grow countries. In those
countries the liquidity in the markets comes from banks, which in their portfolios keep
a great percentage of the government debt. The high movement of capital in 1990s led
to the dependence in between economies all over the world and it was shown that a
crisis in only one market could influence and have negative reactions and to other
countries too.
1.1.3. Developments in financial sector
The causes of the upper crisis were crucial for the expectations of the investors, the
savers and the businesses, that have shown prefer in liquidity. The business capital was
redistributed. Also the high variability of interest rates increased the demand of new,
innovative and complicated financial instruments and played a role in the enlargement
of the banking sector. Banks started to transfer the risk to the lenders and the
borrowers by reducing the period of loans and adapting floating interest rates.
Risk management, after variation appeared seems to be one of the most important
sectors for the financial institutions and banks. The globalization of the markets and
the growth of technology and management information systems contributed in order
bank not only to be gatherer, distributor of financial information and to have the role of
intermediary but to actual be the risk manager. 
In past the main strategy of a financial institution was to manipulate the assets with
purpose:
 The biggest profit in loan portfolios with the lowest risk
 Right predictions in order to have liquidity
7So the liquidity came from deposits that had standard interest rates, which meant that
banks among each other were no competitive. In our days the competitive environment
make the banks to have a goal of maximizing the profits and in order to do so it is
needed first of all to manage their own risk, giving basis in assets, where the quality
evaluation of bank loan portfolio and market risk is being measured.
1.1.4. Why is risk management needed?
Recent financial disasters in financial and non-financial firms and in governmental
agencies point up the need for various forms of risk management. Financial
misadventures are hardly a new phenomenon, but the rapidity with which economic
entities can get into trouble is. Banks and similar financial institutions need to meet
forthcoming regulatory requirements for risk measurement and capital. However, it is a
serious error to think that meeting regulatory requirements is the sole or even the most
important reason for establishing a sound, scientific risk management system.
Managers need reliable risk measures to direct capital to activities with the best
risk/reward ratios. They need estimates of the size of potential losses to monitor
positions and create incentives for prudent risk-taking by divisions and individuals. 
Risk management is the process by which managers satisfy these needs by identifying
key risks, obtaining consistent, understandable, operational risk measures, choosing
which risks to reduce and which to increase and by what means, and establishing
procedures to monitor the resulting risk position.
Risk, may be defined as reductions in firm value due to changes in the business
environment. Typically, the major sources of value loss are identified as:
 Market Risk is the change in net asset value due to changes in underlying
economic factors such as interest rates, exchange rates and equity and
commodity prices.
 Credit Risk is change in net asset value due to changes the perceived ability
of counterparties to meet their contractual obligations.
 Operational Risk results from costs incurred through mistakes made in
carrying out transactions such as settlement failures, failures to meet
regulatory requirements and untimely collections.
 Performance Risk encompasses losses resulting from the failure to properly
monitor employees or to use appropriate methods.
1.1.5. Bank portfolio
Portfolio is a collection of investments all owned by the same individual or
organization. These investments often include stocks, which are investments in
individual businesses; bonds, which are investments in debt that are designed to earn
8interest; and mutual funds, which are essentially pools of money from many investors
that are invested by professionals or according to indices.
Prudence suggests that investors should construct an investment portfolio in
accordance with risk tolerance and investing objectives. For example, a conservative
investor might favor a portfolio with large cap value stocks, broad-based market index
funds, investment-grade bonds and a position in liquid, high-grade cash equivalents. In
contrast, a risk loving investor might add some small cap growth stocks to an
aggressive, large cap growth stock position, assume some high-yield bond exposure,
and look to real estate, international and alternative investment opportunities for his or
her portfolio.
The bank's object must be primarily that of insuring its own liquidity and solvency at
the same time that it distributes its funds fairly and equitably among the different
elements in its clientele. First of all, it needs to analyze its liabilities in a careful and
scientific manner. We may assume that the bank has, let us say, $250,000 of capital
and that it has succeeded in developing a deposit line of, say, $750,000. Analysis
shows that of this deposit line $250,000 is in time deposits or certificates of deposit
which move very slowly and are practically continuously renewed. This leaves
$500,000 of demand deposits, and a study of them makes it reasonably sure that there
will be a rapid turnover only, say, in the spring and again in the autumn. The bank is
therefore in position first of all to invest its funds in assets of fairly long and non-liquid
character corresponding to its $250,000 of inactive deposits. Perhaps it may carry a
part of this amount in real-estate mortgages or it may think well to invest a portion in
sound bonds or government obligations. It thus has as the basis of its portfolio some
long-term securities, part of which (the real-estate securities) will not mature for a
great while and hence are not liquid, while other portions (government securities) will
not mature for a long time, but are very salable and hence may be realized in case of
necessity. 
Behind the demand-deposit line the banker probably has an approximately equal
amount of current notes and other relatively short-term obligations. These may run
from a few days up to six months or more, and it should be the effort of the banker
first of all to arrange their maturities in such a way as to have them fall due steadily and
successively, so as to provide him with the cash he needs to meet the current drafts
upon him. For instance, if he has found that during the months of March and April of
each year, and again during the months of September and October, he is obliged to
make very heavy outlays, his depositors drawing on him and reducing their deposits
correspondingly in order that they may liquidate indebtedness for goods, or may
transfer their funds to other places, he evidently needs to have maturities of fully equal
9amount fall due at about that time. This is for the purpose of providing him with cash
in order that he need not reduce his reserve below its normal or average level.
His portfolio may, therefore, be conceived of as consisting of fairly long-term loans
which, however, are unquestionably payable at maturity and which have been
"bunched" so that their maturities will fall due in such a way as to meet the demands
which are brought to bear upon the banker at the "peak" periods.
The banker, however, has to reckon upon a regular steady flow of funds out of the
bank. He is providing cash for the community, and, while he expects about an equal
amount of income, he cannot be absolutely sure of it. He will therefore endeavor to
carry enough paper falling due from day to day or from week to week to enable him, if
he finds it necessary, to reduce his portfolio by failing to make new loans or refusing to
renew old ones, and thus get in the cash which he needs to meet the regularly recurring
demands to which reference has just been made. 
The banker, however, will not have been in business very long before he will find that a
good many of the assets of his portfolio have a purely local value and market.
Finally, banks have and loan portfolios that are loans that have been made or bought
and are being held for repayment. Loan portfolios are the major asset of banks, thrifts,
and other lending institutions. The value of a loan portfolio depends not only on the
interest rates earned on the loans, but also on the quality or likelihood that interest and
principal will be paid.
1.2. Market risk and Value at Risk in a financial institution
1.2.1. Measuring market risk
There are significant differences in the internal and external views of what is a
satisfactory market risk measure. Internally, bank managers need a measure that allows
active, efficient management of the bank’s risk position. Bank regulators want to be
sure a bank’s potential for catastrophic net worth loss is accurately measured and that
the bank’s capital is sufficient to survive such a loss. Consider the differences in
desired risk measure characteristics that these two views engender.
Both managers and regulators want up-to-date measures of risk. For banks acting in
trading, this may mean selective intraday risk measurement as well as a daily
measurement of the total risk of the bank. Note, however that the intraday measures
that are relevant for asset allocation and hedging decisions are measures of the
marginal effect of a trade on total bank risk and not the stand-alone riskiness of the
trade. Regulators, on the other hand, are concerned with the overall riskiness of a bank
and have less concern with the risk of individual portfolio components. Nonetheless,
given the ability of a sophisticated manager to “window dress” a bank’s position on
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short notice, regulators might also like to monitor the intraday total risk. As a practical
matter, they probably must be satisfied with a daily measure of total bank risk. 
The need of a total risk measure implies that risk measurement cannot be
decentralized. For parametric measures of risk, such as standard deviation, this follows
from the theory of portfolio selection (Markowitz, 1952) and the well-known fact that
the risk of a portfolio is not, in general, the sum of the components risks. More
general, imperfect correlation among portfolio components implies that simulations of
portfolio risk must be driven by the portfolio return distribution, which will not be
invariant to changes in portfolio composition. Finally, given costly regulatory capital
requirements, choices among alternative assets require managers to consider risk
return or risk trade-offs where risk is measured as the changing in portfolio risk
resulting from a given change in portfolio composition. The appropriate risk scaling
measure depends on the type of change being made. For example, the pertinent choice
criterion for pure hedging transactions might be to maximize the marginal risk
reduction to transaction cost ratio over the available instruments while the choice
among proprietary transactions would involve minimizing marginal risk per unit of
excess return.
Risk measurement is costly and time consuming. Consequently, bank managers
compromise between measurement precision on the one hand and the cost and
timeliness of reporting on the other. This trade-off will have a profound effect on the
risk measurement method a bank will adopt. Bank regulators have their own problem
with the cost of accurate risk measurement which is probably one reason they have
chosen to monitor and stress test bank risk measurement systems rather than
undertaking their own risk measurements.
Bank regulators have a singular risk measurement goal. They want to know, to a high
degree of precision, the maximum loss a bank is likely to experience over a given
horizon. They then can set the bank’s required capital to be greater than the estimated
maximum loss and be almost sure that the bank will not fail over that horizon. In other
words, regulators should focus on the extreme tail of the bank’s return distribution and
on the size of that tail in adverse circumstances. Bank managers have a more complex
set of risk information needs. In addition to shared concerns over sustainable losses,
they must consider risk return trade-offs. That calls for a different risk measure than
the “tail” statistic, a different horizon and a focus on more usual market conditions.
Furthermore, even when concerned with the level of sustainable losses, the bank
manager may want to monitor on the basis of a probability of loss that can be observed
with some frequency (e.g. over a month rather than one year). This allows managers to
use the risk measurement model to answer questions such as: Is the model currently
valid? For example, if the loss probability is set at 5%, do we observe a violation once
every 25 days on average? Are traders correctly motivated to manage and not just
avoid risk? How often trader firsts position violate his risk limit relative to the
likelihood of that event? What is the most I can lose on an investment? This is a
question that almost every investor who has invested or is considering investing in a
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risky asset asks at some point in time. Value at Risk tries to provide an answer, at least
within a reasonable bound. In fact it is misleading to consider Value at Risk to be an
alternative to risk adjusted value and probabilistic approaches. After all, it borrows
liberally from both.     
1.2.2. What is Value at Risk (VaR)?
Risk is unavoidable. Risk is the basic ingredient for generating profits in any market
sensitivity activity. From the viewpoint of an investor, risk is about the odds of losing
money, and VaR is based on that common sense fact. By assuming that investors care
about the odds of a really big loss, VaR answers the question; “What is my worst-case
scenario?” or “How much could I lose on a really bad month?”
In a few words, VaR is a single, statistical measure of possible portfolio losses. VaR
shows the largest amount that a portfolio is likely to lose over a specific period of time
at a specified level of confidence. For example, a “95% daily VaR” of €1 million would
mean that the likelihood of that portfolio losing more than €1 million on the worst day
is less than 5%. This in no way means that the portfolio cannot lose more than €1
million. In fact, over 100 days one would expect the portfolio to lose more than €1
million approximately 5 times. Furthermore, it does not mean that one could not
cumulatively lose significantly more over a longer horizon. In its adapted form, the
measure is sometimes defined more narrowly as the possible loss in value from “normal
market risk” as opposed to total risk, requiring that we draw distinctions between
normal and abnormal risk as well as between market and non-market risk. 
While VaR can be used by any entity to measure its risk exposure, it is used most often
by commercial and investment banks to capture the potential loss in value of their
traded portfolios from adverse market movements over a specified period; this can be
compared to their available capital and cash reserves to ensure that the losses can be
covered without putting the firms at risk. 
Taking a closer look at VaR, there are clearly key aspects, which are:
1. To estimate the probability of the loss, with a confident interval, we need to
define the probability distributions of individual risks, the correlation across
these risks and the effect of such risks on value.
2. To focus in VaR is clearly on downside risk and potential losses. Its use in
banks reflects their fear of a liquidity crisis, where a low-probability
catastrophic occurrence creates a loss that wipes out on the capital and
creates a client exodus.
3. There are three key elements of VaR: a specified level of loss in value, a fixed
time period over which risk is assessed and a confidence interval. The VaR
can be specified for an individual asset, a portfolio of assets or for an entire
firm.
4. While the VaR at investment banks is specified in terms of market risks
(interest rate changes, equity market volatility and economic growth) there is
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no reason why the risks cannot be defined more broadly or narrowly in
specific contexts. Thus, we could compute the VaR for a large investment
project for a firm in terms of competitive and firm-specific risks and the VaR
for a gold mining company in terms of gold price risk.
4.2.3. History of VaR
The concept and use of VaR is not recent. VaR was first used by major financial firms
in the late 1980s to measure the risks of their trading portfolios. J.P.Morgan was one
of the first financial institutions to develop an internal VaR model. According to
industry legend, their model is said to have originated when the chairman of
J.P.Morgan, Dennis Weatherstone, asked his staff to prepare a daily one-page report,
the famous “4:15 report”, indicating risk and potential losses over the next 24 hours,
across the bank’s entire trading portfolio. The report was ready by around 1990 and
the measure used was VaR, defined as the maximum likely loss over the next trading
day.
Their model estimated VaR based on standard portfolio theory, using estimates of the
standard deviations (volatilities) and correlations between the daily returns of different
traded instruments. In October 1994, J.P.Morgan set up Risk Metrics as a spin-off
company to establish a market standard through the release of their data and VaR
methodology to third parties. This provided a tremendous impetus to the growth in the
use of VaR and had a dramatic impact in raising risk management awareness
worldwide.
Since that time period, the use of VaR had exploded. The subsequent adoption of VaR
systems was very rapid, initially by securities houses and investment banks and later by
commercial banks and other financial institutions. Currently VaR is used by the vast
majority of financial institutions and is increasingly being used by smaller financial
firms, institutional investors and non-financial corporations.
Regulators also became very interested in Value at Risk. In April 1995, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision proposed allowing banks to calculate their capital
requirements for market risk with their own VaR models, using certain parameters
provided by the Committee. In June 1995, the US Federal Reserve proposed a
“pre-commitment” approach which would allow banks to use their own internal VaR
models to calculate capital requirements for market risk, with penalties to be imposed
in the event that losses exceed the capital requirements. In January 1997, the US
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new rules for corporate risk disclosure
(Securities Act Release No. 7386) which listed VaR as one of three possible market
risk disclosure measures. The European Union’s Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD)
which came into effect in 1996 allows VaR models to be used to calculate capital
requirements for market risks. The Basel II framework, which comes into effect in
2007, continues to endorse internal VaR models to calculate capital requirements for
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market risk and extends the potential use of “Credit VaR” models to calculate capital
requirements for credit risk under the IRB-Advanced approach.
4.2.4. Variants of VaR
There are various extensions and variants of VaR measures, reflecting the range of
applications and problems that the VaR framework can be used:
 Incremental VaR: this is a measure that gives us an indication of how the
addition of a new position might impact the VaR of our portfolio. In other
words, Incremental VaR is the change in VaR associated with adding a new
position to our portfolio.
 Marginal VaR: this is a measure of how VaR changes if we increase the
position by one additional unit of the underlying risk factor. In mathematical
terms, Marginal VaR is the partial derivative of VaR with respect to each risk
factor.
 Cash Flow at Risk (CFaR) and Earnings at Risk (EaR): VaR describes a
general class of probabilistic models that measure the risk of loss in market risk
sensitive instruments and portfolios. However, the same mechanism can be
applied to assess the uncertainty surrounding value in other settings as well,
regardless of how value is defined (portfolio valuation, cash flow, or reported
earnings). The metric that is actually being measured can be adapted to fit the
circumstance in which the method is applied. Both are also probabilistic models
developed from statistical analysis. CFaR is a reasonable choice for
non-financial corporation’s which are concerned with managing the risks
inherent in cash flows and not changes in mark-to-market values. Typically, the
time horizon is much longer in CFaR calculations compared to Value at Risk.
Many industrial companies already apply such tools to develop a more precise
picture of their risk profile and make better hedging decisions. 
4.2.5. Measuring VaR
There are three basic approaches that are used to compute VaR, though there are
numerous variations within each approach. The measure can be computed analytically
by making assumptions about return distributions for market risks and by running
hypothetical portfolios through historical data or from Monte Carlo simulations.
Variance Covariance Approach
For the Variance Covariance approach, we employ one of the most widely used
volatility estimation and forecasting methodology, the J.P.Morgan Risk Metrics. This
approach applies exponentially declining weights to the returns from distant past (and
greater weights to more recent returns) in order to estimate conditional volatilities and
correlations. Exponential smoothing allows for cyclical behavior of return volatility to
be captured. Exponentially weighted moving average model can be considered as an
improvement over the traditional volatility forecasting method, which is based on
moving averages with fixed, equal weights.
Risk Metrics methodology assumes that:
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 Returns on individual risk factors follow conditional normal distribution. While
returns themselves may not be normally distributed and large outliers are far
too common, the assumption is that the standardized return (computed as the
return divided by the forecasted standard deviation) is normally distributed.
 The focus on standardized returns implies that is not the size of the return that
we should focus on but its size relative to the standard deviation. In other
words, a large return, positive or negative, in a period of high volatility may
result in a low standardized return, whereas the same return following a period
of low volatility will yield an abnormally standardize return.
 The change in position’s value is a linear function of the underlying return.
The focus on normalized standardized returns exposed the VaR computation to the
risk of more frequent large outliers that would be expected with a normal
distribution. In a subsequent variation, the Risk Metrics approach was extended to
cover normal mixture distributions, which allow for the assignment of higher
probabilities for outliers. Figure 1.1 contrasts the two distributions.
 In effect, these distributions require estimates of the probabilities of outsized returns
occurring and the expected size and standard deviations of such returns, in addition to
the standard normal distribution parameters.
The strength of the Variance Covariance approach is that the VaR is simple to
compute, once you have made an assumption about the distribution of returns and
inputted the means, variances and covariances of returns. In the estimation process,
though, lie the three key weaknesses of the approach:
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 Wrong distributional assumptions: if conditional returns are not normally
distributed, the computed VaR will understate the true VaR.
 Input error: the variance covariance matrix that is input to the VaR measure is
a collection of estimates by using historical data, some of which have very large
error terms.
 Non-stationary variables: a related problem occurs when the variances and
covariances across assets change over time and that is not uncommon because
the fundamentals driving these numbers do change over time.
 Non linear assets are not allowed: the Variance Covariance estimate of VaR is
designed for portfolios where there is a linear relationship between risk and
portfolio positions. Consequently, it can break down when the portfolio
includes options, since the payoffs on an option are not linear.
Historical Simulation
Historical simulation is a simple, practical approach that requires virtually no
assumption about the statistical distributions of the underlying risk factors. In essence,
the approach involves using historical changes in market rates and prices to construct a
distribution of potential future portfolio profits and losses and then reading off the VaR
as the loss that is exceeded only 5% of the time (assuming 95% confidence).
The distribution of profits and losses is constructed by taking the current portfolio and
subjecting it to the actual percentage changes in the risk factors experienced during
each of the last N periods. The use of the actual historical changes in rates and prices
to compute the hypothetical profits and losses is the distinguishing feature of historical
simulation.
Historical simulation can be described in terms of five steps:
Step 1: Identify the basic risk factors and obtain a formula expressing the
mark-to-market value of the portfolio in terms of the risk factor.
Step 2: Obtain historical prices of the risk factors for the last N periods and calculate
the corresponding percentage changes (returns) in these prices.
Step 3: Subject the current portfolio to the percentage changes calculated in Step 2,
calculating the profits and losses that will occur if comparable returns in the risk
factors are experienced and the current portfolio is marked-to-market.
Step 4: Order the mark-to-market profits and losses from the largest profit to the
largest loss.
Step 5: From the ordered profits and losses select the loss which is equaled or
exceeded 5% of the time (assuming 95% confidence level).
While historical simulations are popular and relatively easy to run, they do come with
baggage. In particular, the underlying assumptions of the model generate give rise to
its weaknesses:
 Past is not prologue: while all three approaches to estimating VaR use
historical data, historical simulations are much more reliant on them for the
simple reason that the VaR is computed entirely from historical price changes.
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 Trends in the data: .all data points in historical simulation are weighted
equally. The price changes from trading days in a year affect the VaR in exactly
the same proportion as price changes from trading days in another year. To the
extent that there is a trend of increasing volatility even within the historical time
period, the VaR will be understated.
 New assets or market risks: difficulty in dealing with new risks and assets for
an obvious reason: there is no historic data available to compute the VaR.
The approach saves us the trouble and related problems of having to make specific
assumptions about distributions of returns but it implicitly assumes that the distribution
of past returns is a good and complete representation of expected future returns. In a
market where risks are volatile and structural shifts occur at regular intervals, this
assumption is difficult to sustain.
Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is a general problem solving technique used to approximate
the probability of certain outcomes by running multiple trial runs, called simulations,
using random variables. It has a number of similarities to historical simulation. The
main difference is that rather than carrying out the simulation using the observed prices
in the risk factors over the last N periods to generate N-1 hypothetical portfolio profits
and losses, one chooses a statistical distribution that is believed to adequately capture
or approximate the possible changes in the risk factors.
Then, a pseudo-random number generator is used to generate thousands or perhaps
tens of thousands of hypothetical changes in the risk factors. These are then used to
construct thousands of hypothetical profits and losses on the current portfolio. Finally,
the VaR is then determined from the distribution of possible portfolio profits and
losses.
17
Monte Carlo simulation can be described in terms of five steps:
Step 1: Identify the basic risk factors and obtain a formula expressing the
mark-to-market value of the portfolio in terms of the risk factor.
Step 2: Determine a specific distribution (stochastic process) for the returns in the
basic risk factors and to estimate the parameters of that distribution. The ability to pick
the distribution is the feature that distinguishes Monte Carlo simulation from the other
two approaches.
Step 3: Use a pseudo-random generator to generate N hypothetical values of changes
in the risk factors, where N is sufficiently large. These hypothetical risk factors are
then used to calculate N hypothetical mark-to-market portfolio values. Then, from
each of the hypothetical portfolio values we subtract the actual mark-to-market
portfolio value to obtain N hypothetical profits and losses.
Step 4& 5: The two last steps are the same as in historical simulation. The
mark-to-market profits and losses are ordered from the largest profit to the largest loss
and the VaR is the loss which is equaled or exceeded 5% of the time.
The designers of a risk management system are free to choose any distribution that
they think reasonably describes possible future changes in the risk factors. Beliefs
about future changes are typically based on observed past changes, so this amounts to
saying that the designers are free to choose any distribution of past changes in the risk
factors. However, Monte Carlo simulation has the advantage of allowing users to tailor
ideas about future patterns that depart from historical patterns. On the other hand, as
the number of market risks increases and their co-movements become more complex,
Monte Carlo simulation becomes more difficult to run for two reasons. First, the
estimation of the probability distributions for hundreds of market risk variables rather
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than just the handful of analyzing a single project or asset. Second, the number of
simulations that are needed to run to obtain reasonable estimate of VaR will have to
increase substantially.
4.2.6. Comparison of VaR methodologies
With three methods from which to choose, the obvious question is: “Which method of
calculating VaR is best”? Unfortunately, there is no easy answer. Each one of the three
approaches to estimating VaR has advantages and comes with baggage. The different
methods of calculating VaR differ in their ability to capture the risks options and
option-like instruments, ease of implementation, ease of explanation to senior
management, flexibility in analyzing the effect of changes in the assumptions and
reliability of the results. The best choice will be determined by which dimensions the
risk manager finds most important. 
In table 1.1 we can see a comparison between the three models.
Comparison of VaR methodologies
Variance and
Covariance
Historical
Simulation
Monte Carlo
Simulation
Able to capture the
risks of portfolios
which include
options?
No, except when
computed using a
short time period
for portfolios with
limited or moderate
options content
Yes, regardless of
the options content
of the portfolio
Yes, regardless of
the options content
of the portfolio
Ease to implement? Yes, depending
upon the
complexity of the
instruments and
availability of data
Yes, for portfolios
for which data on
the past values of
the risk factors are
available
Yes, depending
upon the
knowledge and
technical expertise
of the user
Computations
performed quickly?
Yes Yes No, except for
relatively small
portfolios
Easy to explain to
senior
management?
No Yes No 
Produces
misleading VaR
estimates when
recent past is not
typical?
Yes, except that
alternative standard
deviations/
correlations may be
used
Yes Yes, except that
alternative
estimates of
parameters may be
used
Easy to perform
“what-if” analysis
to examine effect of
alternative
assumptions?
Easily able to
examine alternative
assumptions about
standard deviations
/correlations.
Unable to examine
alternative
assumptions about
No Yes
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the distribution of
the market factors
Table 1.1
4.2.7. Ways VaR can be used
VaR provides a forward-looking analysis of the portfolio’s risk profile in a
comprehensive and consistent fashion. In order to maximize the benefits of having a
VaR system in place, it should be used not only for risk measurement, but also as a:
 Decision-making tool: VaR creates a common denominator with which to
compare various risky choices. Having exposed the risk profile of all
alternative portfolio choices within a VaR framework, we are able to decide
which option suits better our risk preferences. Making risk-based decisions is a
way to use the information provided by the VaR analysis more effectively.
 Risk allocation tool: VaR can be used as a guide to allocate risk capital within
an organization through setting VaR-based position limits. By introducing
VaR-based position limits, we are able to allocate risk capital much more
efficiently within the firm. The total VaR limit can be broken down into smaller
components. The level at which the limit is set for each unit should represent
an allocation of capital reflecting that unit’s appetite for risk tempered by the
firm’s total risk tolerance.
 Performance evaluation tool: VaR can be used as a tool for risk-adjusted
performance evaluation. It gives as the ability to measure the performance of
each trader, we have a better yardstick, or to compare the performances
between two or more traders.
4.2.8. Limitations of VaR
While VaR has acquired a strong following in the risk management community, there
is reason to be skeptical of both its accuracy as a risk management tool and its use in
decision making. The reasons are:
 VaR can be misleading: there is no precise measure of VaR and each measure
comes with each own limitations. The end result is that the VaR that we
compute for an asset, portfolio or a firm can be wrong, and sometimes, the
errors can be large enough to make VaR a misleading measure of risk
exposure. For example, we might have two positions with equal VaRs at some
confidence level and holding period and yet one position might involve much
heavier “tail” losses than the other. The VaR measure taken on its own would
incorrectly suggest that both positions were equally risky. This is perhaps the
greatest limitation of VaR. its lack of information on tail losses.
 True VaR can be much greater than computed VaR: VaR measures the
likelihood of losses to an asset or portfolio due to market risk. First, risk is
almost always considered to be a negative in VaR. While there is no technical
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reason why one cannot estimate potential profits that one can earn with 99%
probability, VaR is measures in terms of potential losses and not gains. Second,
most VaR measures are built around market risk effects, while there is no
reason why we cannot look at the VaR, relative to all risks, practicality forces
up to focus on just market risks and their effects in value. 
 Overexposure to Risk: even if VaR is correctly measured, it is not clear that
using it as the measure of risk leads to more reasonable and sensible decisions
on the part of managers and investors. In fact, there are two strands of criticism
against the use of VaR in decision making. The first is that making investment
decisions based upon VaR can lead to overexposure risk, even when the
decision makers are rational and VaR is estimated precisely. The other is that
managers who understand how VaR is computed, can game the measure to
report superior performance, while exposing the firm to substantial risks.
4.2.9. Supplementary risk measures
Stress testing
The limitations of VaR revealed the need for supplementary risk measures. VaR is a
single, summary, statistical measure of risk under normal market conditions, but
markets do not always behave as expected and unanticipated “shocks” do occur from
time to time. When this happens (or rather before it happens), it is important to ask
“What might be the potential impact of a market crisis on my portfolio?” or “If my
VaR is exceeded, just how much of a loss can my firm sustain before it goes out of
business?”
Stress testing attempts to answer these questions by performing a set of scenario
analysis to investigate the effects of extreme market conditions. To the extent that the
effects are unacceptable, the portfolio or risk management strategy needs to be revised.
There is no standard way to carry out stress testing and no standard set of scenarios to
consider. Rather, the process depends crucially on the judgment and experience of the
risk manager.
There are two types of stress tests that can be performed. The first is actual crisis
historic scenarios, which has the benefit that it preserves the embedded historical
correlation effects between markets and instruments when crisis happened. The ability
of stress tests to replicate this phenomenon is critical, because correlations across risk
factors tend to converge to one (highly correlated) in times of stress. The second type
of stress testing is stress scenarios. These are defined by the user and generally
represent significant step moves in the market.
After developing a set of historic or stress scenarios, the next step is to determine the
effect of the assumed market shocks on the prices of all assets in the portfolio and the
impact on portfolio value. In addition, companies whose risk management strategy
depends upon the ability to frequently adjust or rebalance their portfolios need to
consider the impact of major surprises on market liquidity. It may be difficult or
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impossible to execute transactions at reasonable bid/ask spreads during periods of
market stress.
Expected Tail Loss
There is one question, “When the VaR is exceeded how large can the losses be?”, that
VaR cannot answer. However, there is one measure which can supplement VaR to
provide the information that is missing on tail losses. This is the expected Tail Loss,
which is the expected value (average) of our losses, L, if we get a loss in excess of
VaR. in mathematical terms:
In other words, the expected Tail Loss is estimated by averaging out all the losses
exceeding VaR from the distribution of potential future portfolio losses and profits
computed by the VaR model. Obviously, both VaR and expected Tail Loss depend on
the same underlying parameters and distributional assumptions. However, VaR tells us
the most we can expect to lose if a tail event does not occur and the expected Tail
Loss what we can expect to lose if a tail event does occur.
CHAPTER 2: Portfolio VaR and Systematic Risk
4.3. Investment theories and VaR analysis
4.3.1. History of the modern portfolio theory
The main investment tools in modern portfolio theory are:
 Markowitz Theory
 Tobin’s Separation Theorem
 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
 Capital Market Line (CML)
 Security Market Line (SML)
 Single Index Model (SIM)
 Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)
Things really began with Harry M. Markowitz and that active risk management will be
able to develop to the point of becoming an essential element in portfolio management.
1952: Publication of an article “Portfolio Selection” in the "Journal of Finance".
1959: Publication of "Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments". 
Harry Markowitz formalized what investors already knew when they looked to have
placement profitability correspond to the level of risk. But he was the first person to
mathematically establish that the total risk of a portfolio is inferior to the sum of the
individual risk for each element of a portfolio. By taking periodical performances as
random variables, it was possible to calculate performance expectations, standard
deviation and correlations. By seeking the minimum risk for each level of performance,
we obtain what Markowitz called: the efficient frontier.
1958: James Tobin extends the field of studies by introducing the risk free asset.
It is therefore possible to study the cases where the investor becomes the lender or
borrower and the impact of financial levers. This will bring the concept of “Capital
Market Line” and allow filing in line, all of the portfolios made up of a combination of
risky portfolios and risk free asset.
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1964: William F. Sharp formalized the "Capital asset pricing model" (CAPM).
By introducing the β (beta) and using the CAPM, Sharp establishes a simple relation to
obtain expected returns without having to go through the manipulation of large
numbers of data and in particular the calculation of co-variances.
1976: Stephen A. Ross introduces the "Arbitrage Pricing Theory" or the model of
evaluation by arbitrage (MEA).
The CAPM remained a model of reference until the beginning of the 1980’s. But
Stephen Ross tried to get rid of the restrictive hypothesis of the CAPM by elaborating
a new model in which the risk factors are many.
4.3.2. Markowitz Theory
The Markowitz framework is often generically known as the mean-variance
framework. The assumptions of this model are:
 Investors base their decisions on expected return and risk, as measured by the
mean and variance of the returns on various assets.
 All investors have the same time horizon. In other words, they are concerned
only with the utility of their terminal wealth and not with the state of their
portfolio beforehand and this terminal time is the same for all investors.
 All investors are in agreement as to the parameters necessary, and their values
(information is freely and simultaneously available to all market participants), in
the investment decision making process, namely, the means, variances and
correlations of returns on various investments. The investors are homogeneous.
 Financial assets are arbitrarily fungible.
The basic tenant of the Markowitz theory is that knowing the mean and standard
deviation of the returns on the portfolio is sufficient and that our desire is to maximize
the expected return and to minimize the standard deviation of the return. The standard
deviation is the measure of riskiness of the portfolio. One thing that is obvious,
because individuals are utility maximizers, is that they will always switch from one
investment to another which has the same expected return but less risk, or one which
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has the same risk but greater expected return, or one which has both greater expected
return and less risk. (Figure 2.1)
4.3.3. Tobin’s Separation Theorem
Ever since the 1957 publication of James Tobin's seminal paper on what has become
known as "The Separation Theorem", investors have had the theoretical basis for
modulating portfolio risk.
In essence, the Theorem postulates that an investor can control the risk of a basket of
risky investments by either borrowing at the risk free rate or leveraging the portfolio
(and its risk), or alternately, lending at the risk free rate and tempering risk. Since most
investors are risk averse, the clear preference of most investors is to combine the risky
basket of securities with risk free bonds, and thereby lower the downside risk of the
portfolio. In common parlance, we would term this the stock/bond asset allocation
decision.
 The risk free bond allocation is usually defined as short-term treasury securities (1 to 5
year maturities), or perhaps expanded to include short term investment grade
corporate paper. It is sometimes suggested that the risk free allocation should be made
up of inflation indexed treasuries.
James Tobin, said if you hold risky securities and are able to borrow, buying stocks on
margin, or lend, buying risk-free assets, and you do so at the same rate, then the
efficient frontier is a single portfolio of risky securities plus borrowing and lending, and
that dominates any other combination. (Figure 2.2)
Tobin's Separation Theorem says you can separate the problem into first finding that
optimal combination of risky securities and then deciding whether to lend or borrow,
depending on your attitude toward risk. It then showed that if there's only one
portfolio plus borrowing and lending, it's got to be the market.
4.3.4. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
The CAPM is what is known as an equilibrium model. The market participants act to
put the market into equilibrium. A number of additional assumptions (over and above
those of Markowitz) are made in the CAPM, which are thought to be not too far from
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reality, yet are useful in order to simplify the derivation of the model. Of course, a set
of such assumptions is necessary in any economic model. In this model, they are:
 Unlimited short sales are allowed.
 There is a risk free rate () for lending and borrowing money. The rate is the
same for lending and borrowing and investors have any amount of credit.
 There are no transaction costs in the buying and selling of capital assets.
 Similarly, there are no income or capital gains taxes.
 The market consists of all assets. (No assets are exclusively private property).
 Assets are infinitely divisible.
 Perfect competition--an individual cannot affect the price of an asset by his/her
buying or selling. 
 All investors have the same information. 
 Investors make their decisions ased solely on the expected returns and
variances of portfolio returns.
The expected return on an asset can be divided into two parts, the return for deferring
consumption, and a compensation for bearing risk. The return for deferring
consumption is the return on the risk-free asset. Hence the return for bearing risk is
E(R) - Rf. Mean-variance analysis implies that the return for bearing risk is
proportional to the risk. Consequently, in mathematical terms CAPM is:
Where,  is the risk premium, which actual is the return in excess of the risk free rate of
return that an investment is expected to yield and b is a parameter called beta, which is
used to describe how well a security or portfolio correlates to the return of the market
as a whole.
There are three areas of interest:
1. b = 0: An asset that has no volatility (no risk) does not have returns that vary with
the market and therefore has a beta of zero and an expected return equal to the
risk-free rate. 
2. b = 1: An asset that moves with a volatility exactly equal to the market has a beta of
one. In other words, it is perfectly correlated. By definition, its return rate is equal to
the market. (E(R) =  
3. b > 1: An asset that experiences greater swings in periodic returns than the market,
which, by definition, has a beta greater than one. This asset is expected to earn returns
superior to those of the market as compensation for this extra risk. 
The general idea of CAPM is that investors should be compensated in two ways: time
value of money and risk. An asset is expected to earn the risk-free rate plus a reward
for bearing risk as measured by that asset’s beta. Figure 2.3 below demonstrates this
predicted relationship between beta and expected return, this line is called the Security
Market Line. 
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For example, a stock with a beta of 1.5 would be expected to have an excess return of
15% in a time period where the overall market beat the risk free asset by 10%. 
The CAPM model is used for pricing an individual security or a portfolio. For
individual securities, the security market line (SML) and its relation to the expected
return and systematic risk (beta) shows how the market must price individual securities
in relation to their security risk class. 
4.3.5. Capital Market Line (CML)
Capital market line is referred to as a measure employed to evaluate portfolio
performance. Capital market line or CML is a graph employed in asset pricing models
to depict rates of return in a market portfolio. Capital market line describes rates of
return for efficient portfolios that are dependent on level of risk and risk free rate of
return for a specific portfolio. CML originates from the assumption that all investors
will possess market portfolio. Quantum of risk is positively correlated to the expected
return.
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Capital market line, Figure 2.4,  is deduced by drawing a tangent line that starts from
the intercept point located on efficient frontier and extends to the point where
expected return matches risk free rate of return. Capital market line is believed to be a
better measure than efficient frontier as it takes into consideration risk free asset in a
portfolio. All points on the CML have better risk return profiles when compared to any
portfolio located on efficient frontier.
4.3.6. Security Market Line (SML)
The Security Market Line can be thought of as the graphical representation of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model. It illustrates the concept that it is possible to obtain any
combination of risk and expected return along the slope of the graph by investing some
portion of your investment in the market portfolio and borrowing the rest.
The Security Market Line is useful for determining whether an investment in an asset
offers a good expected return for the risk taken. By providing the Beta of the asset, the
Risk free rate and the Market Risk Premium, we will be able to plot the asset on the
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Security Market Line graph (Figure 2.5). If the Expected return versus Beta of the
asset is plotted above the Security Market Line, the asset can be thought of as being
able to provide a greater return for the inherent risk. An asset with a point below the
Security Market Line can be thought of as getting less return for the amount of risk
taken.
4.3.7. Single Index Model (SIM)
The Single Index Model assumes that there is only one macroeconomic factor that
causes the systematic risk affecting all stock returns and this factor can be represented
by the rate of return on a market index. According to this model, the return of any
stock can be decomposed into the expected excess return of the individual stock due to
firm-specific factors, commonly denoted by its alpha coefficient (α), the return due to
macroeconomic events that affect the market, and the unexpected microeconomic
events that affect only the firm. Specifically, the return of stock S is:
The term  represents the stock's return due to the movement of the market modified by
the stock's beta, while  represents the unsystematic risk of the security due to
firm-specific factors.
Macroeconomic events, such as interest rates or the cost of labor, causes the
systematic risk that affects the returns of all stocks, and the firm specific events are the
unexpected microeconomic events that affect the returns of specific firms, such as the
death of key people or the lowering of the firm's credit rating, that would affect the
firm, but would have a negligible effect on the economy. The unsystematic risk due to
firm specific factors of a portfolio can be reduced to zero by diversification.
The Single Index Model is based on the following:
 Most stocks have a positive covariance because they all respond similarly to
macroeconomic factors.
 Some firms are more sensitive to macroeconomic factors than others and this
firm specific variance is typically denoted by its beta, which measures the
variance compared to the market for one or more economic factors.
 Covariances among securities result from differing responses to
macroeconomic factors. Hence, the covariance of each stock can be found by
multiplying their betas and the market variance. ().
This last equation greatly reduces the computations required to determine covariance
because the covariance of the securities within a portfolio must be calculated using
historical returns, and the covariance of each possible pair of securities in the portfolio
must be calculated independently. With this equation, only the betas of the individual
securities and the market variance need to be estimated to calculate covariance. Hence,
the index model greatly reduces the number of calculations that would otherwise have
to be made for a large portfolio of thousands of securities.
4.3.8. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)
Arbitrage pricing theory (APT), in finance, is a general theory of asset pricing, which
has become influential in the pricing of stocks. APT holds that the expected return of a
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financial asset can be modeled as a linear function of various macro-economic factors
or theoretical market indices, where sensitivity to changes in each factor is represented
by a factor-specific beta coefficient. The model-derived rate of return will then be used
to price the asset correctly, the asset price should equal the expected end of period
price discounted at the rate implied by model. If the price diverges, arbitrage should
bring it back into line. The theory was initiated by the economist Stephen Ross in
1976.
The fundamental foundation for the arbitrage pricing theory is the law of one price,
which states that two identical items will sell for the same price, for if they do not, then
a riskless profit could be made by arbitrage, buying the item in the cheaper market then
selling it in the more expensive market. It is predicated on the fact that two financial
instruments or portfolios, even if they are not identical, should cost the same if their
return and risk is identical. The justification for this is that the only reason that a
financial instrument is purchased is to earn a return for a certain amount of risk, no
other aspect of the financial instrument matters. Hence, the law of one price requires
that any two financial instruments or portfolios that have the same return-risk profile
should sell for the same price. If this is not true, then a profit could be made by selling
short the security or portfolio with the lower return, and buying the higher return
portfolio. The assumptions of the arbitrage pricing theory are:
 Investors seek return tempered by risk: they are risk averse and seek to
maximize their terminal wealth.
 There is a risk free rate for lending and borrowing money.
 There are no market frictions.
 Investors agree on the number and identity of the factors that are systematically
important in pricing assets.
 There are no riskless arbitrage opportunities.
The model starts with a linear equation:
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Where,  the value at time t of index j, s the index for a single security,  the return on
the single security s,   the a-parameter of security s,  the sensitivity of the return on
security s to the level of index j and  a random variable.
The APT appears to be a multi-factor version of the CAPM model where the returns
are sensitive to the levels of indices, rather than to the returns of the single index.
Typical, APT indices include:
 Unanticipated changes in inflation.
 Unanticipated changes in industrial production.
 Unanticipated changes in risk premium, as measured in corporate bond spreads.
 Unanticipated changes in the slope and level of the term structure of interest
rates.
The APT theory involves a derivation of an equilibrium model, via an assumption of
homogeneous expectations.
4.4. Beta Coefficient
4.4.1. Beta Coefficient and Systematic Risk
The beta coefficient is a measure of an asset's risk and return in relation to a broad
market, meaning that it will show, more or less, how the asset or a portfolio of assets
will respond as the market moves up or down. It is used in the CAPM and regression
analysis. 
A beta coefficient will show how an asset's performance is sensitive to systematic risk,
which is the risk that can affect an entire market. An investor who is seeking to
measure the expected return of a particular stock, for example, will use a stock market
index to represent the broad market. The stock market index will normally have a beta
coefficient of 1, and in theory, a security whose beta is 1.4, for example, will move 1.4
times the move of the index. This means that if the stock market index was to move up
or down by 20 percent, the security would move 28 percent accordingly.
On average, many securities have a beta coefficient of 1, which means that they move
more or less in line with the market. A security with a beta coefficient of more than 1 is
more risky than the average market and is fit for more aggressive investment
strategies. On the other hand, those whose beta coefficient is below 1 are considered
to be less risky, because their performance is less tied to the systematic risk. Moreover,
there are assets whose beta is negative, and these tend to have dull returns when the
economy is robust, but in a downturn, they have a tendency of outperforming most
other investments.
The asset with a negative beta is inherently less sensitive to systematic risk, and for this
reason, an investor might use this type of asset to hedge his or her portfolio. To hedge,
in this sense, is to try to offset losses that might result if a systematic event arises.
Moreover, when performing a regression analysis, an individual might use historical
data of returns in order to estimate the link between an asset's performance and that of
the wider market. 
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The beta of an asset can change over time; for example, the beta of a particular asset
can be 1.2 for about a decade, then for various reasons, it might change to 1.4 in the
following decade. Thus, in regression analysis, the beta coefficient is meant to be the
same for the period being sampled. That is, if an individual was to use a sample from
two decades where in one it was 1.2 and the other 1.4, the resulting information will
most likely be misleading.
4.4.2. Methods of estimating Beta
Beta is simply a measure of sensitivity of stock to market movement. There are three
methods of estimating beta as forecasters of covariance:
 Unadjusted beta: the first method simply estimates beta from historical data.
The historical beta for each stock S can be obtained through regression analysis
of stock return  against market return from a past period, t=1 to t=T. The
calculation of beta for each stock is formally shown below. The estimation of
historical beta is subjected to error and might deviate significantly from actual
beta since actual beta is not perfectly stationary over time. The betas might
change significantly from one period to another and large random error may
lead to substantial forecasting error.
 Blume’s beta: Blume’s analysis on the behavior of betas over time shows that
there is a tendency of actual betas in the forecast period to move closer to one
than the estimated betas from historical data. Blume’s technique attempts to
describe this tendency by correcting historical betas to adjust the betas towards
one, assuming that adjustment in one period is a good estimate in the next
period. Consider betas for all stocks S in period 0,  and betas for the same
stocks S in the successive period 1, . The betas for period 1 are then regressed
against the betas for period 0 to obtain the following equation: . The
relationship implies that the beta in period 1 is k1+k2 times the beta in the
period 0. Therefore, if   is A, the estimate of beta in the next period   will be
(k1+k2*A) instead of A. This adjustment sets the average beta to undergo
similar trend for subsequent forecast periods. If there is an increasing beta for
period 1, average beta for period 2 will consequently increase. This might not
reflect the actual beta movement from one period to another. Hence, Blume
further modified the average beta towards historical mean. This was done by
first calculating the average beta of all stocks for period 1 and 2,  and . To
adjust the mean of the forecasted beta towards historical mean, the new
forecast of beta for each stock S   is obtained by subtracting  from the
previously forecast of beta and adding. 
 Vasicek’s beta: as mentioned earlier, the average beta tends to move towards
one over time. Another method to capture this tendency is via Vasicek’s
technique. Vasicek’s technique adjusts past betas towards the average beta by
modifying each beta depending on the sampling error about beta. When the
sampling error is large, there is higher chance of larger difference from the
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average beta. Therefore, lower weight will be given to betas with larger
sampling error. The following formula demonstrates this idea:
4.4.3. Beta stability: Fabozzi and Francis/Kim and Zumwalt/Chen research
Over the past four decades, many studies have theoretically and empirically examined
the validity of the CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black
(1972). The CAPM indicates that the systematic risk or beta is only variable that can
explain the difference in average returns between stocks. While the CAPM is an
extremely elegant and useful tool, many researchers have doubt on the overall
efficiency of the model.
Recently, a number of tests on the CAPM model have been examined. Many studies
document a consistent and highly significant relationship between average return and
beta based on the assumption of constant risk. However, others evidence that beta
alone has less ability in explaining the returns because firm size can play an important
role, in addition to the beta.
In addition, there are concerns about the varying risks that become main factors in
return-generating process. Various studies indicate that the CAPM model assuming
constant risk cannot participate in Bull and Bear market conditions. Levy (1971)
suggests that there is a need to separate betas between Bull and Bear markets.
However, Fabozzi and Francis (1977) propose the varying risk model to examine the
stability of beta over these two markets. They find that the beta is stable even the
market conditions change. Later on, many empirical studies support Levy (1971) that
there is a need of calculating two betas, one for Bull period and the other for Bear
period. It is because the traditional CAPM does not work well when market conditions
change.
Fabozzi and Francis (1977, 1979) indicate that the CAPM show significant results in
Bull and Bear market periods.  They are among the first to evidence the stability in
betas over Bull and Bear market on individual stocks and mutual funds. Fabozzi and
Francis (1977) use a sample of 700 NYSE stocks and examine whether the beta in
CAPM model differs significantly when measured over Bull and Bear markets during
1966-1971. They indicate that the betas appear to be insignificantly affected by the
change in conditions between the two periods. Furthermore, Fabozzi and Francis
(1979) study whether betas are persistent for mutual funds from 1965 to 1971. They
indicate that mutual funds generally respond indifferently to Bull and Bear markets.
These empirical results reinforce that mutual fund managers do not raise their betas
during the Bull periods and do not reduce their betas during the Bear periods to earn
additional risk-adjusted premiums.  Eventually, these imply no difference in beta during
Bull and Bear markets.  Since the beta does not differ with market conditions, the use
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of beta estimated for the entire period (constant beta) is still powerful in
return-generating process. 
Kim and Zumwalt (1979) argue on the finding of Fabozzi and Francis (1977, 1979) in
which the betas of the CAPM model are sustainable in both Bull and Bear markets.
They oppose that even if the constant betas are potentially sound in the two types of
markets, there should be the return variations in Bull market that may not consistent
with those in Bear market. Rather, they believe that the risk-averse investors would
demand higher risk premium when taking unfavorable risk during the Bear market and
pay a premium when consuming favorable risk during the Bull market. Therefore, they
examine the risk premiums associated with the returns variation in these two markets
during 1962-1976. They find the positive risk premium in Bear periods and the
negative premium in Bull periods. Thus, they suggest that the responses to Bull and
Bear markets allow betas to vary over time.
Consistent with Kim and Zumwalt (1979), Chen (1982) also shows that the varying
risks in market model appears to be more appropriate than the constant risks when the
Bull and Bear conditions are taken into account. Using the Kim and Zumwalt (1979)
procedures, he finds that during 1965-1977, investors prefer higher compensation if
assuming the unfavorable variations of returns occur in Bear markets. Investors then
pay premium for the favorable variations of return occurring in Bull markets. 
4.4.4. Investors attitude towards risk
Investors’ attitude towards risk varies. Some investors are willing to take on greater
risk in the hope for greater returns while other investors are less willing to take on risk.
Investors can therefore be classified in three categories:
 Risk averse: most investors are risk averse, that is, they do not like risk. If an
investor has the choice between two investments with the same expected return
but different levels of risk, they will choose the one with the lowest risk. If an
investor has the choice between an investment with different expected returns
and the same level of risk, they will choose the one with the highest expected
return. What happens if the two investments have differing returns and risk? It
will depend on how risk averse the investor is. If an investor is really risk
averse then the choice is the investment with the lowest risk.
 Risk neutral: risk neutral investors do not concern themselves with risk. They
will seek the highest expected return regardless of the risk involved. Their
choice depends only on returns and has nothing to do with risk.
 Risk seeker/lover: hence as the name suggests, a risk seeking investor will
always choose the investment with the highest risk regardless of return. Risk
seekers actively seek out risky investments.
Since most investors are risk adverse financial markets behave as if, collectively, they
are risk averse. This makes sense as investor control the financial markets and if the
majority of them as a whole are risk averse then financial markets are expected to act
the same way.
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CHAPTER 3: Empirical Illustration
4.1. Collecting and analyzing data
In order to complete the empirical illustration we need to collect the data. We use daily
closing prices of five Greek bank stocks (ATE bank, Alpha bank, Emporiki, Eurobank
and Piraeus) for a period of five years and the daily prices for the same period of the
Greek stock index (ASE). This index is the one that shows the general movement of
the Greek stock exchange market, it is a weighted index and involves over 60 high
capital corporations, so we can say that it is a representative indicator.
Furthermore, we assume that we have a portfolio that includes those five bank stocks
and that we will invest in this portfolio 5,000.00€.
Asymmetry of Returns
Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more precisely, the lack of symmetry. A
distribution, or data set, is symmetric if it looks the same to the left and right of the
center point. In all of the stocks we can see that skewness () is higher than zero, so
time series are asymmetry to the right. Kurtosis on the other hand is a measure of
whether the data are peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. That is, data sets
with high kurtosis tend to have a distinct peak near the mean, decline rather rapidly,
and have heavy tails. Data sets with low kurtosis tend to have a flat top near the mean
rather than a sharp peak. A uniform distribution would be the extreme case. And
because kurtosis () for all stocks is different from 3 () we do not have normal
distribution. More specifically, kurtosis is actually higher than 3 (>3) so returns tend to
have a distinct peak near the mean. 
Expected Returns
In order to calculate the expected returns of the prices of our stocks we have used the
logarithmic returns:
Why use logarithmic returns? By using log prices we can convert an exponential
problem to a linear problem.  Logarithmic returns are simply first differences of log
prices sampled at the same unit time interval.  Sums of logarithmic returns over a time
interval, give the logarithmic return for that interval, and a mean return can be
calculated by dividing that interval by the number of time units in the interval.
Note that the mean log return of a time series of prices is determined by only three
numbers, the starting price, the last price and the number of time intervals between the
prices.  This is true even if the series consisted of thousands of returns.  This
"expected" return thus gives no information about what happened over the sub
intervals.  On a log price plot this is the same as determining the rate by fitting the
price series by drawing a line through the first and last prices.
Regression of stocks in Greek index
34
To run a regression we have used the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is a
method for estimating the unknown parameters, in our case the beta and the alpha of
the regression, as it is described in the single index model:
Also coefficient correlation of the stock with the index is:
The characteristic line shows the changes in returns of every stock and the index. The
slope is the beta and is measures in ratio scale.
We have run a regression; by using excel, in order to estimate the betas. Regression
equation:
Estimations with OLS
We use Kim & Zumwalt research to investigate if there is any asymmetry in beta
coefficient, according to the equation:
With,
Now, we set that D=0 so:
We run the regression for each stock and we have collected the following data:
The results are:
ATE ALPHA EMPORIKI EUROBANK PIREUS
b 0,067689 1,20141 1,19097 1,07211 1,13520
0,105538 0,48 0,419 0,567 0,528
0,60212 1,27167 1,30613 1,15298 1,19162
0,75248 1,13138 1,07453 0,99034 1,07815
0,10610 0,48 0,421 0,568 0,529
Table 3.1.
From function (1) the expected returns and the variance of each stock is:
As we can see from table 3.1 for the four stocks out of five
While the opposite, occurs only in the stock of ATE bank. After running the regression
we can see that in our case the beta of our portfolio rises when the market goes down
and vice versa. 
Portfolio VaR Estimation with “beta model”
We use the function:
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With
We can observe, as it is shown in table 3.2, that  by using “beta model”:
b=1,0552 =1,005
92,16 96,49 87,77
95% 109,64
99% 155,053
95% 150,93
99% 213,437
Table 3.2.
Stock s.d. VaR 95% VaR 99% Systematic
risk
ATE 0,022125 36.395€ 51.464 0,000490 0,000054778
5
ALPHA 0,018413 30.289€ 42.834 0,000339 0,000097263
5
EMPORIKI 0,019516 32.103€ 45.399 0,000381 0,000096481
7
EFG 0,015118/ 24.869€ 35.169 0,000229 0,000086823
6
PIREUS 0,016578 27.269€ 38.564 0,000275 0,000091950
7
INDEX 0,0106188 87,34 123,512 0,000113
0,006387688
5
52,54 74,298 0,000040802
6
0,006338766
8
52,14 73,729 0,000040180
0
Table 3.3
Where systematic risk is calculated by using the following formula:
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CONCLUSION
In the empirical part, it was found the impact of beta coefficient instability, that it is
observed in upward and downward market conditions, in evaluating VaR of a single
stock but and of a portfolio. Even though VaR seems to be underestimated by using
beta coefficient, that method of calculating Value at Risk combined with the volatility
of systematic risk gives us the opportunity to observe a high correlation of the market
with risk management. The quantification of market risk for bank portfolios can be
differentiated depending on the impact of markets in systematic risk and on the
differentiated level degree of the portfolios. So it is bank managers’ decision whether
or not they will reconstruct their portfolios in order to be in the desirable level of risk.
The economic crises in global markets led in the creation of new more sophisticated
models in order to manage risk. And as the story goes, the need of new ideas and
solutions will appear much more often.
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